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Chapter 13 
Distribution of Agency across Body and Self 
Ruth Parry 
Introduction 
Many chapters in this book have examined distribution and attribution of agency across 
multiples of people, or people and artifacts. Here though, I look at attribution of agency 
within persons: how agency, and thus flexibility and accountability, can be distributed 
across body—or body parts—and self. To do so, I draw on a corpus of video recordings 
of physical therapy treatment sessions, supplemented with brief examples from 
recordings made in other settings—so as to illustrate that the phenomena I examine are 
not peculiar to physical therapy. 
I demonstrate that people can construct three broad configurations: 
1. The body (or body part) and the self are constructed as agents separate to 
one another, disaggregated, capable of “independently: acting one upon 
the other. 
2. The self and body (or body part) are constructed as connected: with the 
self possessing the body or body part and having an associated control, 
flexibility, and accountability for bodily actions. 
3. The self and body are constructed as one and the same entity and agent: an 
integrated, accountable, flexible individual. 
I describe the seemingly innocuous and subtle interactional practices we use to construct 
these quite radically different embodiments/identities (Kockelman 2007a). I will show 
that we can do so in reference to our own self, or to other persons. The practices describe 
and illustrate comprise the following: 
• Ways that body parts get referred to: whether, for example, we refer to the 
thumb, or to your or my thumb. 
• What we put in the subject and object position of our utterances: for 
example, whether I say that I do something, or that my leg does 
something. 
• Eye gaze—through which we can show ourselves to be talking to a part of 
our interlocutor’s body—and thus separating it out from a larger whole. 
Conversely, we can show that we are talking to the “inner” or whole 
person by looking him or her in the eye. 
• Meanings (i.e., semantics) and metaphors that provide for different 
configurations of the person, body, and self. 
It’s worth briefly mentioning that the first practice is available in English but not in all 
languages—although it seems likely that in different languages, other practices are 
available to do the same kind of work. It is also worth noticing that these configurations 
have a dualist character, something I will consider as I go along. 
As well as describing how people manage to construct different body/self 
configurations, I examine when and why they do so. In the context of this book, it should 
come as no surprise that this has to do with how humans attribute and convey capacity 
and responsibility for their actions, failings, and endeavors. In a final section, I outline 
some implications for how we understand and conceptualize distributed agency, and 
consider how the dualist character of personhood so prevalent in our talk makes sense in 
social terms. That is, whatever the material discoveries of neuropsychology, and their 
echoes in linguistic understandings of inalienable possession (Kockelman 2007b), I am 
going to show you that when we talk and interact with one another, we do and we can 
make self and body more, less, or completely—for all practical purposes—separate. 
First though, I need to attend to two terminology issues. Frustratingly for me, 
English does not currently provide a word that signifies, exclusively, the particular part or 
aspect of a person that is other than the person’s body. Soul might once have been used, 
but has lost some of its value in the context of current understandings that brain, 
consciousness, and body are utterly intertwined in physical terms. In this piece though, I 
need to refer to this non-body aspect of a person, and to do so I use self. Also, rather than 
the body or body part(s), hereon I use the shorthand body/part. 
 
Configuring Body and Self as Unified, or as More or Less Separate 
To put flesh on the bones of the three broad configurations, I examine a series of cases 
drawn from a much larger set. What I say about the practices and their patterning and 
functioning in these individual cases reflects analysis of 66 sequences of interaction, 
nearly all of which involved more than one, often many more than one reference to 
body/part. Forty-five cases were drawn from a dataset of 86 hours of video-recorded 
physiotherapy treatment sessions, and 25 were collected from other recordings and 
transcripts of everyday conversations and also other healthcare interactions. All 
transcripts presented here are simplified versions of the more detailed transcripts created 
during analysis. 
CASE 1: “KEEPING YOU IN THAT POSITION” 
In this example, a therapist and a patient who is receiving rehabilitation for a 
stroke are talking about a particular goal of his therapy: getting his back and 
pelvis area more flexible. In the course of this, the therapist describes the physical 
problem: 
Parry PD DT1_2.35 
1 T:   And what’s happening is your pelvis is tilting  
2       forwards. So it’s keeping you in that position.  
3        and then you’re quite rounded h[ere a]t the shoulders  
4 P:                                                        [Mmm] 
Using everyday, mundane language resources, the therapist moves rapidly and seamlessly 
(lines 1–2) from (a) referring to your pelvis with its implication of a possessive 
connection between patient’s self and body, to (b) formulating the pelvis as a separate 
agent that is keeping the self of the patient in a particular posture. The second formulation 
entails referring to the pelvis with the impersonal pronoun it, and doing so in the subject 
position, with you—the self/patient, in the object position. This subject/object 
arrangement works to convey the pelvis as an agent, and the self/patient as being acted 
upon by it. In other words, the therapist constructs a part of the patient’s body as a 
discrete, separate agent that acts upon the self of the patient. 
As she continues her description (line 3), the therapist uses different means to 
separate or distance the self of the patient and his pelvis. The subject/object arrangement 
is different, the patient—you—is now the subject and thus agent over the shoulders. The 
distancing here is done through the pronoun the. In extracts to follow, I will demonstrate 
and examine how people recurrently use impersonals such as the, this, or a when naming 
a body part, and the way that this distances the body part from the self. 
Why do people talk in ways that distance, disaggregate a self and their body (or 
body parts)? Recurrently, as above, they do so when referring to something that is a 
problem—an undesirable physical state or movement. By talking in a way that makes the 
body part a separate agent acting on the self, or in a way that avoids using possessives 
such as my or your, one can camouflage the connection—sometimes referred to as 
“inalienable possession”—between the person whose physical state is referred to and his 
or her body/part. One thereby implies that the person neither controls, nor bears 
accountability, fault, and responsibility for the undesirable bodily state or action. One can 
sever, so to speak, the connection—physically as much as psychologically.  
The next case once again illustrates use of the rather than your, and also 
introduces another way people can do this disaggregation: through their gaze patterning. 
 
CASE 2: “ALWAYS THE SLOW ONE” 
A patient and therapist have been working together on a balance exercise in which 
the patient kneels up on a mat, trying to keep herself upright with straight hips and 
bottom tucked in. The patient repeatedly sinks back and down because of hip 
weakness. The therapist is kneeling behind the patient and encouraging her to 
keep upright by squeezing her buttock muscles (as in line 1). As the patient begins 
to sink downward once again (line 3), the therapist says “go on, an again, this one 
especially there” while touching and tapping on the patient’s right hip and 
buttock—urging the patient to straighten up, and in particular to do so by using 
her right buttock and hip.  
Parry PD GT1_26.49 
1 T:    That’s better. Go on squeeze squeeze lovely, 
2         (4.4) 
3 T:      Good. Go on an again this one  
4           especially. There ((gazing to P’s hips)) 
5           (1.5) ((T taps on P’s right hip, P continues to attempt  
             to keep upright, then shifts body position leaning  
              towards front of P)) 
6 T:      This right one’s always the- ((gazing to P’s face)) 
7 P:       This [one yes the sl]ow one 
8 T:               [the slow one.] 
9 T:    Yea[h] 
10 P:       [This one is] (like) the slow one 
11 T:     Now see whether you can find your balance. 
 
When giving instructions (lines 1 and 3–4), the therapist looks to the back of the patient’s 
hips. She moves on to give a reason for her “this one especially” instruction (lines 6–7). 
By the time she starts this talk about a reason, she has shifted her body enough to allow 
her direct her gaze to the patient’s face and make eye contact. Through this patterning, 
the therapist treats the patient’s body and self as separate agents: the body as agent of the 
physical action, and the self—or consciousness—as an agent with regard to hearing and 
understanding a reason for the action. This gaze patterning is recurrent in the physical 
therapy data (Parry 2013), with therapists using their gaze and associated body 
positioning in a way that disaggregates patients’ body parts from their reasoning minds—
their selves. As noted, this case also features use of an impersonal pronoun: the therapist 
talks of this right one, not your right one (line 6). This brings us neatly to case 3, in 
which an impersonal pronoun the, and the personal pronoun your, are used in rapid 
succession. 
 
CASE 3: THE THUMB YOUR THUMB 
This patient’s traumatic brain injury has left him with difficulties controlling his 
left side. The therapist here has been moving and stretching his affected left hand 
and thumb. As we join the session, the therapist asks the patient to try to shake her 
hand with his left hand. 
Parry PD KT3_9.15  
1 T:     C’you shake my hand? 
2        (3.7) 
3 T:     Pleased to meet you ((jokey tone)) 
4          = uh huh huh heh huh 
5          (0.9) ((P lets go of T hand)) 
6 T:      Now  
7          (0.4) 
8 T:     ‘S not bad 
9          (0.6) 
10 T:   ’Part from, part from the thumb it’s fine Andrew  
11        (.)  
12 T:    And can you take your hand away from my hand. 
13        (1.9) 
14 T:    See if you can try again but making more  
15 T:    of a space for your thumb. 
16         (2.4) 
17 T:    Yeah. That’s- that feels- that feels better to me. 
18 P:    I got the thumb splint. 
19       (0.7) 
20 T:   Yeah, and whe- how long are you wearing that for. 
 
The therapist says the thumb (line 10) when your thumb would be equally grammatical, 
and when it is perfectly clear which of his two thumbs she is referring to. As in the other 
cases, she does this when referring to a physical shortcoming. The thumb is, for all 
practical purposes, conveyed as a separate entity at this point: the patient’s self and 
thumb are disaggregated, and this reduces the implication that he is responsible or 
accountable for the physical failure being talked of. This case also illustrates a 
counterpart: when she moves into instructions the therapist says, can you take your hand 
away and [make] more of a space for your thumb. By using your at this juncture, she 
foregrounds the patient’s connection with—in other words, his control over—his hand 
and thumb. So now, the thumb is portrayed as under the patient’s control. 
In the physical therapy recordings, both therapists and patients frequently use 
possessives in situations where controlled, purposeful action is talked about and/or 
encouraged. Using your or my (when alternatives are possible) treats self and body as 
connected, and people do so when there is good reason to emphasize someone’s control, 
responsibility, and physical agency in relation to their body. 
The rapidity with which one can move between different configurations of the 
body/self/person relationship is particularly evident in this case, as is the fact that in 
doing so, a speaker does not need to do anything extra as it were—one does not need to 
provide talk that, for instance, cancels out an earlier meaning or gives some reason for the 
change. 
CASE 4: IT COLLAPSED; YOU WERE CONTROLLED 
This final case from physical therapy illustrates particularly clearly how people 
use different body/self configurations to convey just who or what is responsible 
for a physical success or a physical failure. The patient, whose stroke has resulted 
in left-sided weakness, is standing with feet slightly apart. The therapist is 
encouraging her to shift her weight from one foot to the other. A key point of the 
exercise is for the patient to try to keep her weaker left leg and knee straight as 
she shifts her weight to this weaker left side.  
Parry PD QT2_20.17 
1 T:  Okay that’s- that was better that time 
2       because the first time it just kind  
3       of collapsed ((smiley, gentle tone))  
4       (0.9) 
5 T:     That time you were more controlled. 
6         (0.2) 
7 T:     Now, as you come back over towards me I want you to . . .  
At line 2, the therapist’s it refers to the patient’s left knee and leg. Her talk ascribes this 
as the entity that collapsed. When she describes the recent successful controlled 
performance of the exercise, the patient and her body are construed as a single unified 
agent you. The therapist is thereby able to praise the patient and treat her as responsible 
for the success. 
A series of shorter cases now supplement the detailed analysis above by 
demonstrating that not just therapists but also patients construct different body/self 
configurations via the same resources; also that the same kind of phenomena arise in 
other healthcare settings and in informal conversations between friends. 
 
CASE 5: MY BRAIN DOESN’T TRUST THE LEFT SIDE 
Near the start of a treatment session, a patient who suffered a stroke two weeks 
previously talks to a therapist about his difficulty in standing up from a sitting 
position:  
Parry Doc HT3_17.03 
1 P:       Still my brain doesn’t trust? the- the er  
2            t[he le]ft er [tha]t’s why- that’s why 
3 T:         [yeah] [yeah] 
4 P:       every time I stand up? I-I put most of  
5           the- my weight on my le-=on my right.  
6          (.)  
7 P:     Because my brain doesn’t trust the left side 
 
Here the patient makes my brain the subject of his talk, and his left side the object. This 
subject/object arrangement has parallels to case 1, in which the therapist’s talk 
constructed the patient’s pelvis as an agent that was making the patient rounded. There 
are differences though: rather than self and body part, the patient disaggregates two body 
parts: brain and left side. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to hear him treating my brain as in 
some sense his controlling self, and the left side as separate to this brain/self. 
CASE 6: I’VE GOT A FOOT 
This case is from a different healthcare setting: a consultation with a primary care 
doctor. The extract comes from the start of a consultation.  
Robinson and Heritage 2005 page 487: Extract 11: lines 1-5 (simplified) 
1 DOC: What you up to? 
2 (.) 
3 PAT: I’ve gotta bad foot that I can’t- get well. 
4 (0.2) ((Doc moves his chair close to foot)) 
5 DOC: Which part. 
Here, the patient uses both an impersonal pronoun, a, and a verb phrase that I can’t get 
well. These work to disaggregate her self, as an agent, from her foot—upon which she 
has been attempting to act. 
 
 
CASE 7: THOSE BIG TOENAILS 
With this case, we move to everyday conversations. Two friends, Emma and 
Lottie, are talking on the telephone. We join the conversation as Emma describes, 
in dramatic terms, a fungal infection affecting her toenails.  
NB IV:10R (original transcript line 1472-6) (simplified) 
1 Emma:  Oh God it’s terrible Lottie my toenails  
2              they’re jis look so sick those big toenails it jis  
3              u-makes me sick. Yihknow they’re diss (.) u-dea:d.  
4              Everything’s dead I d- I sat out (.) tihday en  
5             I said my God em I jis (.) DYING it’s (.) like  
6            I’m ossified. 
 
Emma switches from the personal my toenails (line 1), to the impersonal those (line 2) in 
the context of escalating from “terrible” to nauseating. She also moves from describing a 
situation—it’s terrible—to conveying what she sees as she looks at those big toenails. 
The impersonal pronoun those adds to the conveyed sense of an external view. By line 6, 
she reaches a further configuration: her whole self is conveyed as ossified. 
 
CASE 8: PHYSICALLY, NOT MENTALLY 
Another everyday conversation case comes from a telephone call between friends. 
Ava has called Bee, and at the point we enter the call, Bee has been checking with 
Ava where she is calling from.  
TG Ava and Bee, page 15 Line 09 (simplified) 
1 Bee:     I finally said something right. (0.2)  
2             You are home. Hmm 
3 Ava:    Yeh- I believe so. [Physically anyway 
4 Bee:                                  [mmh 
5 Ava:    Yea –a-h Not mentally though ((smiley, slightly laughing  
                voice)) 
 
Within a jokey exchange, Ava makes a dualist claim—spacially separating her mental 
and physical self via semantic resources (the meanings of her words) as opposed to the 
grammatical or gaze resources we saw above. 
 
CASE 9: MY BODY DIDN’T NEED IT 
Similarly, in this next case, we see semantics in use to configure the physical 
body and self as separate. 
SN-4_05_lines 01-06 (simplified) 
1 Sher:    Hi Carol  
2 Carol:   H[i]  
3 Ruth:        [Caro]l, Hi  
4 Sher:    You didn’t get an icecream sandwich,  
5 Carol:   I know, I decided that my body didn’t need it  
6 Sher:     Yes but ours did heh-heh-heh 
 
 
CASE 10: SOMETHING BEHIND HER  
This final case comes from a telephone conversation between friends Marsha and 
Erma. Erma is describing her son’s girlfriend Ilene: 
MDE:MTRAC:60-1:5 (simplified) 
1 Erma:   Cause she’s gotta very pretty face she ez gorgeous  
2              blue eyes, and she really pays very little attention 
3              to it and I kind’v am not suprized when Joey says  
4             that she wants to go into Social Services, she  
5             seems like that kind. Y’know w’t I mean she seems  
6             like she has a lot (.) there’s something behind her. 
 
Erma builds a sense of connection but also a distinction between the inner, private Ilene 
(behind her—line 6) and Ilene’s physical aspect—gorgeous eyes, and a pretty face. This 
sense is built both through the design of her description—Ilene has physical attributes, 
and the semantic and metaphoric use of prepositions to indicate this character of 
selfhood. 
 
Conclusions 
People can allocate to the body, or parts thereof, agency that is more or less separate from 
the agency of the self. In our social lives at least, while the body and self can be a unified 
and fused entity, the body and self can also be disaggregated, fissioned, divided. That is, 
in our interactions, we commit to a form of dualism. This is not a strict “here is body, 
there is mind” type of dualism, but rather a continuum that can be cut in a variety of 
places. We commit to this form of dualism as a way of understanding ourselves, our 
personhood. This enables us to manipulate—to shape—the meaning of our own, and 
other people’s physical successes, failures, and features. 
As I have shown above, these kinds of allocation of agency are accomplished via 
rather basic design features of body movement and talk, including gaze, and grammatical 
and semantic resources. Through the meanings we thereby build, we can encourage 
others to hear matters of fault, responsibility, endeavor, and achievement with regard the 
physical as more or less attributable to the body or body part, or to the “true,” “inner” self 
(the soul, or even the brain). It is noticeable that the more distancing configurations are 
noticeably charitable—we might even say compassionate; the person talking can absolve 
the person/self being talked about. Being able to allocate responsibility and even blame 
for physical problems to the body (and therefore as less—or even not at all—the actual 
person’s fault) helps us to limit negative emotional and relationship consequences of 
criticizing or blaming another’s physical state or behavior. Conversely, being able to 
convey that positive performances and attributes are integral to the person him- or herself 
allows us to emphasize that person’s personal competence, and thus praise, motivate, and 
encourage him or her, facilitating alignment in terms of both local actions and the 
ongoing sense of relationship between the people involved. 
My analysis has shown that people locally constitute agency and relations 
between selves and bodies in a moment to moment way that is fitted to social 
circumstances and also highly flexible. Previous research that has shown that the way one 
refers to another person is not random; rather, it does work—it performs social actions—
such as conveying another person as more or less close to the speaker (Enfield and 
Stivers 2007; Stivers 2007). My analysis shows that the way we refer to our bodies and 
our selves is also not a random or haphazard matter, but a socially shaped means of 
working up distinct embodied identities fitted to interpersonal circumstances and 
relationships. Finally, the evidence I have presented shows that in order to understand 
fully the distribution of agency, we need not only to recognize the ways and means 
through which it can be distributed, fissioned, and fused “across and among individuals” 
(Enfield 2013:104), but also to add the recognition that people also distribute agency 
within individuals. 
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